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We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous.
We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may
be induced by an increase in that interest group’s size to propose policies geared
towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size can have adverse eﬀects
on policy outcomes for this same lobby. This provides another rationale as to
why some interests do not organize. Moreover, we ﬁnd that a second-mover
advantage in Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-type lobbying models with exogenous
policy proposals can turn into a second-mover disadvantage when the proposal is
endogenous.
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In a recently published book, “Lobbying and policy change: who wins, who loses, and
why?”, Baumgartner et al. (2009) followed 98 randomly selected policy issues in which
interest groups were involved over the years from 1999 - 2002. They report that
“a surprisingly large number of issues consist of a single side attempting
to achieve a goal to which no one objects or in response to which no one
bothers to mobilize. Ironically, the lack of counter-mobilization is a good
predictor of failure.[...] One might think that with no opposition, those
lobbyists working on behalf of the issues with only one side would rule the
day in Washington. Reality is far from this, even when the “lobbyist” in
question is the Defense Department.”1
Furthermore, the authors argue that “although uncertainty no doubt increases when
advocates face greater active opposition, it would be premature to conclude that policy
success is less likely when there is greater opposition. Just as resources are not clear
predictors of policy success, the presence of active opposition is likely to be a similarly
inadequate predictor.”2
These observations seem to stand in contrast to the theoretical literature on lobbying,
where usually, an interest group’s eﬀorts to change the status quo are – if at all – detri-
mentally aﬀected by greater opposition. In this paper, we present a simple legislative
lobbying model that is able to account for the observed patterns. We explain why
it may be bad for an interest group seeking policy change if there is no opposition.
We also give conditions under which an increasing opposition lobby turns out to be
beneﬁcial or detrimental for eﬀorts to change the status quo.
To substantiate our arguments, we augment a legislative lobbying model of the Grose-
close and Snyder (1996) type (i.e., the interest groups move once and sequentially) with
an endogenously derived policy proposal. The basic version of the model considers only
two types of individuals that diﬀer in their preferences regarding policy and are orga-
nized into two interest groups of diﬀerent sizes. The legislators are also of either of the
two types. First, we show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one
1Baumgartner et al. (2009, p. 57). 17 of the examined 98 cases ran into no active opposi-
tion. Baumgartner et al. (2009) provide summaries of the issues under examination on the website
http://lobby.la.psu.edu.
2Baumgartner et al. (2009, p. 76)
1lobby may propose a policy change favoring the opposing lobby knowing that it will be
approved by legislative vote. Interestingly, and in accordance with the above described
observations, such a policy change will not be introduced if the interest group opposing
the policy change is suﬃciently small. Or to put it diﬀerently, a policy change may be
induced by an increase in the size of the opposing interest group.
The intuition behind this result runs as follows. Even though a stronger lobby group
opposing a policy change makes it harder for the pro-change lobby to ensure a majority
in the legislature, it also implies higher payments to the legislators associated with a
vote for policy change and thus increases the incentive to propose the change. We
further show that via the same mechanism, an agenda-setter3 with preferences for
a policy change may introduce a bill that is not implementable – i.e., that will be
defeated by the legislative vote, even though implementable (more moderate) policy
changes might instead be proposed.
Another important result of our analysis is that in our Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-
type set-up where the interest groups move sequentially and make only one oﬀer each,
the adverse eﬀect on policy of an increase in interest group strength can only occur for
the second-mover lobby and never for the interest group moving ﬁrst. Consequently, we
can identify situations wherein the second mover possesses a disadvantage in the sense
that he would have been better oﬀ moving ﬁrst. In contrast, when the policy proposal
is given exogenously, the second mover possesses a clear advantage. Hence, in this class
of models, the second-mover advantage may become a second-mover disadvantage when
the policy proposal becomes endogenous.
We check the robustness of our results by allowing for greater heterogeneity of policy
preferences. Unlike in the basic set-up, we allow interest-group size to vary endoge-
nously. That is, the policy proposal determines the composition of the interest groups,
one of which is lobbying for the proposal and the other against it. Considering dif-
ferent proposals, it is the politically moderate individuals who are ‘swinging’ between
supporting a policy change or the status quo. We show that it is precisely this ‘swing-
ing’ between the interest groups depending on the policy proposal that can lead to
extreme policy outcomes that are to the disadvantage of the politically moderate. In
fact, there are situations wherein the politically moderate will be better oﬀ if they do
not organize into interest groups. This result may also explain why some interests do
3Throughout the paper, we use the terms policy proposer and agenda-setter interchangeably.
2not organize.4 In the robustness discussion of our model, we further argue that our
main results – except for the one on the second-mover disadvantage – are not speciﬁc
to using a Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-type set-up.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we relate our paper to the
existing literature. Section 3 describes the model. We characterize the equilibrium of
the lobbying subgame for a given proposal and the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
entire political game in Section 4. We discuss the role of interest-group size on policy
outcomes in Section 5. There we establish our main results. The robustness discussion
follows in Section 6. In addition to the issues mentioned earlier in the introduction, we
also address welfare implications and extensions of the model with respect to lobbying
at the stage where the policy proposal is crafted. Section 7 concludes. The proofs and
some numerical examples are relegated to the appendix.
2 Relation to the Literature
The literature on the lobbying of interest groups hoping to aﬀect policy outcomes
includes two large branches. One studies to what extent interest groups can aﬀect policy
outcomes by providing relevant information to the lawmaker (see e.g. Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2002)). The present paper relates to the second branch, wherein interest
groups oﬀer politically valuable resources or campaign contributions in exchange for
legislative favors. In particular, our paper augments the legislative lobbying model
of Groseclose and Snyder (1996) by an agenda-setter who endogenously decides on
the policy to be proposed for a legislative vote. While Groseclose and Snyder (1996)
examine the eﬀect of the lobbies’ budgets on the size of the super-majorities and the
voting outcomes for a given policy proposal, our extension allows us to study the eﬀect
of the interest groups’ budgets on policy outcomes. In our model, a larger lobby means
a higher budget. While this can never lead to worse legislative voting outcomes for
the larger lobby when the proposal is given, our model shows that if the proposal is
endogenously chosen, a higher budget available for lobbying does not necessarily lead
to more favorable policy outcomes for this lobby.
The present paper is also closely related to but diﬀerent in focus from that of Breton
and Zaporozhets (2009), which examines the Groseclose and Snyder (1996) set-up with
4Usually the reason for some interests not being organized is either a collective action problem
(Olson, 1965) or ﬁxed costs of organization Mitra (1999).
3an exogenous proposal when the legislators have preferences regarding outcomes rather
than their vote and show the connection with notions from cooperative game theory.
Recently, Dekel et al. (2008) and Dekel et al. (2009) suggested a vote-buying game
that ends not at a pre-determined stage but only after two consecutive oﬀers go by
without any change in who would win. The papers study diﬀerent variants of this type
of game. Even though the focus of the ﬁrst paper is on general elections, the model can
be interpreted as a legislative vote-buying game where a policy proposal is up for vote
against the status quo. In Section 6.5, we discuss whether our results would change if
we chose such a vote-buying model as a lobbying subgame after the proposal had been
made rather than the Groseclose and Snyder (1996) set-up. We argue that for some
variants of the Dekel et al. (2008) and Dekel et al. (2009) lobbying model, our results
would change. In others, however, it is possible to obtain similar results as in our basic
model. This suggests that our results are not speciﬁc to the Groseclose and Snyder
(1996) set-up.
There is also an interesting relation to Diermeier and Myerson (1999), who examine
the internal organization of legislatures. In their basic framework, they also make use
of the Groseclose and Snyder (1996) set-up with exogenously given policy proposals
and consider a game between diﬀerent chambers of the legislature that strategically
choose their internal organization to maximize the payments they receive from the
interest groups. In our model, it is simply the other way around: the organization of
the legislature is given, and the agenda-setter chooses a policy proposal to maximize
his beneﬁt.
Other legislative lobbying models with endogenous policy proposals include Snyder
(1991), Baron (2006), Helpman and Persson (2001), and Grossman and Helpman
(2001). Snyder (1991) considers only one lobbyist who makes the proposal and then
buys a majority of votes for it in the legislature. He ﬁnds that the equilibrium policy
lies between the lobbyist’s ideal point and the median of the legislators’ ideal points.
This is not necessarily the case in our model, which can – in principle – be perceived
as extending Snyder (1991) via an additional competing lobby and substituting the
policy proposer with a legislator. These additional components drive our main results
such as a potentially positive eﬀect of opposition for the lobby seeking policy change.
Baron (2006) also presents a model of competitive lobbying in a majority-rule legisla-
ture with endogenous agenda-setting under complete information. His focus is diﬀerent
from ours in that he considers only two possible proposals and examines under what
4conditions both lobbies are active in equilibrium and when there are minimal winning
coalitions or supermajorities.
Helpman and Persson (2001) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) combine a common
agency approach with vote-buying in the legislature. However, Helpman and Persson
(2001) do not model direct competition between the lobbies and focus on how the
variations of the political system aﬀect the distribution of policy beneﬁts. Grossman
and Helpman (2001, ch. 9) present a model where one of three legislators is the
agenda-setter who in the ﬁrst stage is oﬀered contribution schedules for both: a policy
proposal and his support in the legislative vote. In the second stage, the lobby seeking
the policy change needs to buy an additional legislator to garner majority support for
the proposal. With respect to the choice of the policy proposal, this set-up is essentially
the standard common-agency problem with only one lawmaker who is being lobbied.
In such a framework, a higher budget for one lobby given the budget of the other lobby
cannot lead to worse policy outcomes. In fact, the common-agency framework predicts
that lobbies without opposition will always succeed in initiating policy changes to their
beneﬁt and consequently cannot account for, e.g., the observations by Baumgartner
et al. (2009) described in the introduction.
3 The Model
The model considers a continuous legislature with a measure of seats S that decides
via simple majority rule on a policy t. We use S to denote the set of legislators. The
policy will be chosen from a closed and connected set τ ⊂ R. Initially, a status quo
policy ts ∈ τ is in place.
In the basic version of the model, there are only two types of individuals, the X-type
and the Y -type. The types diﬀer with respect to the utility that they derive from
policy t ∈ τ. The utility of a type i ∈ {X,Y } from policy t is ui(t). We assume that
utility is strictly concave on τ and bounded from above and below. The X-types’ most
preferred policy is t∗
X = mint∈τ t, and the Y -types’ best policy is t∗
Y = maxt∈τ t. This
implies that uX(t) is strictly decreasing and uY(t) is strictly increasing on τ. Unless
otherwise stated, we assume that ts  = t∗
i. Altogether given policy t, each individual
of type i ∈ {X,Y } enjoys total utility Ui(t) = ui(t) + d, where d denotes ”money”. In
principle, d may represent transfers that also depend on policy t.
Given the status quo policy and the utility functions, we can divide the policy space τ
5into subsets of policies preferred to the status quo by each type. A policy t is preferred
to the status quo by type i if vi(t) := ui(t) − ui(ts) > 0. Consequently, the set of
policies preferred to the status quo by types X and Y are deﬁned by τX := {t : t < ts}
and τY := {t : t > ts}, respectively. This implies that τY ∩ τX = ∅ ∀ts ∈ τ.
Legislators are also either of type X or type Y .5 The share of Y -type legislators is
denoted by λY. Accordingly, the legislature is comprised of a measure (1 − λY)S of
legislators of type X. We assume that there is a majority of Y -type legislators – i.e.,
λY > 1
2.
For example, with regard to the U.S. Congress, one could think of the X-types as
the Republicans and the Y -types as the Democrats. A broader interpretation might
refer to the group of X-types as a social elite and the group of Y -types as the people.
Alternatively, the X-types might be entrepreneurs and the Y -types the workers. In
principle, we can think of the types as members of any two groups that have opposing
interests. A policy t then determines how the payoﬀs are distributed among the two
groups.
3.1 Lobbying
Although there are many channels through which lobbying takes place, we assume
that “money” is paid to the legislators.6 There are two interest groups. A measure li
of individuals of type i is organized in an interest group denoted by i ∈ {X,Y }.7 For
simplicity, we assume that legislators are not members of interest groups.
Suppose that a policy t is up for vote against ts in the legislature. If an individual of
type i is in favor of the proposal, he possesses the maximal willingness vi(t) to support
t. If the individual prefers the status quo, he is willing to spend −vi(t) to prevent
policy t. Accordingly, the maximal willingness to pay of interest group i to inﬂuence
the legislative vote in its favor given that t is voted against ts amounts to li|vi(t)|.
In this paper, we abstract from budget constraints of single individuals. Hence, the
interest groups’ budgets are only constrained by their size – i.e., the measure of the
5In Section 6.3.1, we discuss the role of more heterogeneous preferences of the legislators.
6The “money”-payments can be generally interpreted as something which is beneﬁcial for the re-
ceiver and costly for the donor. They can range from explicit bribery over providing lucrative positions
for politicians to donations to the policy proposer’s party.
7More broadly, li can also be interpreted as the interest groups’ level of organization. The idea is
that not only may size (in terms of oﬃcial members) matter with regard to the budget available for
lobbying but also, how eﬃciently resources can be collected from non-members may have an impact.
6set of members. We denote the lobbies’ budgets by Bi(t) := li|vi(t)|. The lobbying
expenses of the interest groups are shared equally among their members.
The interest groups can use the budget to make payments to the legislators. For each
legislator k ∈ S, we use bi(k,t) to denote the oﬀer of interest group i given policy
proposal t for a vote of legislator k in favor of the proposal if t ∈ τi and against the
proposal otherwise. We refer to bi( ,t) as lobby group i’s oﬀer function. Each oﬀer
function must respect the lobby’s budget – i.e.,
R
S bi(k,t)dk ≤ Bi(t).
3.2 Voting behavior of the legislators
We assume that legislators have preferences regarding policy outcomes rather than
regarding the act of voting itself. The legislators take the interest groups’ oﬀer functions
bi( ,t) as given and vote for the alternative that yields the greatest expected utility.
If no payments are made, they vote for the policy alternative that yields the highest
direct utility from policy.8 Since the legislature comprises a continuum of legislators,
no single legislator is pivotal. This means that each legislator votes in favor of the
lobby group that makes the highest oﬀer – i.e., a legislator k who has received at least
one positive payment oﬀer supports policy proposal t if and only if
bi(k,t) ≥ bj(k,t), (1)
where i,j ∈ {X,Y },i  = j, and i denotes the lobby that is in favor of the policy proposal,
whereas j is the one that prefers the status quo. Note that in (1), we have assumed
that when positive payments are oﬀered and legislators are indiﬀerent, legislators vote
against the status quo.9
The assumptions that legislators care about outcomes and that the legislature is con-
tinuous (i.e., that no legislator is pivotal) have been made to simplify the analysis.
Our main results are not aﬀected by these assumptions.10 Besides simplicity, another
justiﬁcation for assuming away pivot considerations is the following. As will become
clear later, with our model speciﬁcation, it is cheapest for the winner of the lobbying
game to bribe a supermajority of legislators. Thus, no legislator would be pivotal even
8They vote for proposal t if v(t) > 0 and against it otherwise.
9This assumption brings a slight mathematical simpliﬁcation but does not aﬀect the generality of
the results.
10A formal set-up where legislators vote as if they are pivotal can be found in Schneider (2009).
With this setting, the same qualitative results are obtained.
7if the legislature were discrete.11
3.3 The political game
Now the entire political game can be described. In principle, it is a lobbying game
in the style of Groseclose and Snyder (1996) augmented by a policy proposer that
(endogenously) determines the proposal to be voted on in the legislature. The pol-
icy proposer is also a member of the legislature which is a common feature of most
democracies.12 More precisely, we assume that the agenda-setter is randomly drawn
from the majority type of legislators, which is type Y .13 With respect to the U.S.
Congress, where the composition of the committees usually reﬂects the seat shares of
the parties in the respective chamber, the Y -type individual proposing the policy can
be perceived as the median legislator in the respective committee. With regard to most
parliamentary democracies, our speciﬁcation is equivalent to the assumption that there
is a ’Y party’ that forms the government and proposes a new policy to the legislature.
In Section 6.1 we will also examine the case where a legislator of minority-type X is
the agenda-setter. Because the majority of legislators are of type Y , the legislative
vote will be in favor of lobby Y without any payments. Hence, lobby X is the natural
ﬁrst mover in the lobbying subgame. The game possesses the following structure:
1. The policy proposer decides on a policy proposal tg to put up for a vote against
ts.
2. Interest group X oﬀers a payment schedule {bX(k,tg)}k∈S to the legislators for a
vote pro tg if tg ∈ τX and for a vote in favor of the status quo if tg / ∈ τX.
3. Interest group Y oﬀers {bY (k,tg)}k∈S for a vote pro t if tg ∈ τY and for a vote in
favor of the status quo if tg / ∈ τY .
4. Each legislator k who receives at least one positive payment oﬀer votes for tg if
and only if bi(k,tg) ≥ bj(k,tg), where tg ∈ τi and i  = j. If he obtains no positive
payment oﬀer, he votes for tg ∈ τi if and only if he is of type i. The policy
11See also Dal Bo (2007) for a similar argument.
12In parliamentary democracies, the executive branch, which makes the proposals, is formed by one
or more parties with a majority of seats in the legislature. In presidential democracies such as the
US, the executive is not part of the legislature. However, it does not possess proposal rights in the
legislature either. Only members of Congress can introduce a bill.
13A similar assumption is made by, e.g., Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002). In our setting, the
assumption is equivalent to assuming that the median of the legislature may propose policy.
8proposal will be implemented if the majority of the legislators vote in favor of it.
If no majority for tg can be established, the status quo remains in place.
4 Equilibrium
We begin the equilibrium analysis by characterizing the equilibrium of the lobbying
subgame – i.e., the subgame that starts once policy proposal tg has been introduced.
4.1 The lobbying subgame
To determine the equilibrium in the lobbying subgame, it is necessary to know how
large a budget is necessary for the ﬁrst mover X to outcompete the second mover Y
in the lobbying game.
The structure of the lobbying subgame in the present paper is a variant of Groseclose
and Snyder (1996) where legislators have no preference regarding the act of voting for
or against the proposal. This allows to infer from Proposition 1 in Groseclose and
Snyder (1996) that it is optimal for X to follow a leveling strategy when making its
oﬀers. A strategy is leveling if bX(k,tg) is the same for almost all bribed legislators.14
The intention behind a leveling strategy is to leave no ‘soft spots’ to the second mover
of the lobbying subgame. A more detailed discussion of leveling strategies can be found
in Groseclose and Snyder (1996).
We can now determine how expensive it is for X to ensure a majority of votes in the
legislature for its preferred policy alternative. We use m to denote the measure of
legislators who receive payments additional to those necessary for a minimal majority.
This implies that the size of the supermajority that votes for the preferred policy of
interest group X is S
2 + m legislators.15 m is the measure of legislators that interest
group Y needs to buy back to ensure the approval of its preferred alternative. Hence,
given proposal t, for X to win the lobbying subgame, each of the bribed legislators
must receive payments of at least
BY (t)
m . Because a leveling strategy is cheapest for X,
14’Almost all’ means all bribed legislators except a set of measure zero.
15Groseclose and Snyder (1996) showed that it can be less expensive for the ﬁrst mover, in our case
interest group X, to form a supermajority in the legislature rather than a minimal winning coalition.
9the total payments to establish a supermajority of size S








Since the objective is declining in m, it is optimal to make payments to the entire
legislature – i.e., m∗ = S
2.
Consequently, the minimal amount of payments by X necessary to win the lobbying
game is TX(t) := 2 BY(t). The factor by which lobby X’s budget needs to exceed that
of Y to win the lobbying subgame has been called the hurdle factor by Diermeier and
Myerson (1999). In this particular case, we obtain a hurdle factor of 2.
We are now in the position to characterize the equilibrium in the lobbying subgame.
Two situations can arise: (1) the willingness to pay of lobby X, BX(t), is (weakly)
higher than TX(t), or (2) it is lower than TX(t). In the ﬁrst case, X will spend TX(t) to
ensure a majority of legislative votes in its favor. In the second case, it will abstain from
oﬀering payments.16 Interest group Y will not make a positive oﬀer in the ﬁrst scenario
because it has no chance of inﬂuencing the legislative vote. In the second situation it
oﬀers no payments because the majority of the legislators is of type Y and votes in its
favor anyway. We summarize our observations using the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium in the lobbying subgame)
For each policy proposal of the policy proposer, t, there exists a unique equilibrium in
the lobbying subgame which implies that
(i) if BX(t) ≥ TX(t)
Stage 2 X makes payments bX(k,t) =
2BY (t)
S to all of the legislators for a vote in its
favor.
Stage 3 Y does not make any payment oﬀer.
Stage 4 All legislators vote in favor of X. Hence, if t ∈ τX, t will be implemented,
otherwise the status quo prevails.
(ii) if BX(t) < TX(t)
Stage 2 X makes no payment oﬀers.
16The reason is that the second mover only needs to secure a minimal majority and will buy back
the “cheapest” legislators. By this, the ﬁrst mover cannot make a positive oﬀer without incurring some
costs for itself. Thus, when knowing that it will lose the lobbying subgame, a positive payment oﬀer
is not proﬁtable.
10Stage 3 Y makes no payment oﬀers.
Stage 4 All legislators of type X vote in favor of X and all legislators of type Y vote
in favor of Y . If t ∈ τY , t will be implemented, otherwise the status quo
prevails.
According to Proposition 1, only the ﬁrst-mover lobby X will make payments to the
legislators in equilibrium. Furthermore, we know that X oﬀers the same amount of
payments to all legislators. Hence, we can drop indices and write b(t) instead of bX(k,t).





Before we move on to the characterization of the equilibrium of the complete game, the
next lemma examines how the total payments of lobby X necessary to craft a majority
in the legislature and payments per legislator change with the size S of the legislature
and the size lY of the second-mover lobby. This is instructive as it already reveals a
great part of the mechanics of the model.
Lemma 1 (Comparative statics of lobbying)











The proof follows directly from taking the derivatives of TX(t) = 2 lY(t)|vY (t)| and
b(t) as given in equation (2). Lemma 1 indicates that an increase in the size of the
legislature does not aﬀect the amount necessary to win the lobbying game but leads
to strictly lower payments per legislator.17 With respect to total payments TX(t), an
increase in S increases the size of the supermajority but at the same time reduces
payments per legislator. In our basic model, the two eﬀects cancel each other out. An
increase in the size of interest group Y has the eﬀect that more resources are necessary
for X to outcompete Y in the lobbying subgame. For this reason, total payments to
the bribed legislators increase, and as a consequence, so do payments per legislator.
17Note that the share of type-Y legislators is held constant when diﬀerentiating TX(t) with respect
to S.
114.2 Partitions of the policy space
The equilibrium of the lobbying subgame allows one to characterize which policy pro-
posals will be approved by the legislature and which ones have no chance of being
implemented. This is important information for the policy proposer when considering
his proposal. To identify the policies that can be implemented, it is convenient to use
the function
F(t) := lXvX(t) + 2lY vY (t), (3)
which indicates for each policy t whether the budget of X exceeds the amount necessary
to outcompete Y in the lobbying subgame. A policy t is implementable if and only
if F(t) ≥ 0. In each of the sets τi, the policies that can be implemented by the
policy proposer are deﬁned by τI
i := {t ∈ τi : F(t) ≥ 0}. We denote the set of all
implementable policies by τI := τI
Y ∪ τI
X. Similarly, the sets of policies that cannot be
implemented are referred to by τ¬I
i := τi \ τI
i .
Equation (3) reveals two important properties. First, F(t) is a strictly concave function
on τ as both vX(t) and vY (t) are strictly concave. Second, F(ts) = 0, which follows
from vX(ts) = vY (ts) = 0. The two properties imply that F(t) possesses at most two
roots in the interval τ with one of them being ts. We can now fully characterize the sets
of implementable and non-implementable policies dependent on the shape of function







Proposition 2 (Partitions of the policy space)
(i) If F ′(ts) > 0 and F(t∗
Y) ≥ 0, then τI
Y = τY and τ¬I
X = τX
(ii) If F ′(ts) > 0 and F(t∗
Y) < 0, then τI
Y = (ts,ˆ tY], τ¬I
Y = (ˆ tY ,t∗
Y ] and τ¬I
X = τX,
where ˆ tY  = ts and F(ˆ tY) = 0.
(iii) If F ′(ts) = 0, only the status quo is implementable.
(iv) If F ′(ts) < 0 and F(t∗
X) < 0, then τ¬I
Y = τY , τI
X = [ˆ tX,ts) and τ¬I
X = [t∗
X,ˆ tX),
where ˆ tX  = ts and F(ˆ tX) = 0.
(v) If F ′(ts) < 0 and F(t∗
X) ≥ 0, it follows that τ¬I
Y = τY and τI
X = τX.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The intuition of Proposition 2 can be summa-
rized as follows: the slope of F(t) at t = ts indicates on which side of ts the function F(t)
attains its maximum. In other words, it indicates whether the set of implementable
policies is a subset of τY or τX. We directly obtain the following corollary:
12Corollary 1 (Set of implementable policies)
The set of implementable policies will never comprise both, policies favoring X and
policies favoring Y .
Formally: if F ′(ts)  = 0, then τI ⊆ τX or τI ⊆ τY .
The second part of the conditions in (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) – i.e., F(t∗
Y ) ≥ 0 or F(t∗
X) ≥ 0
– speciﬁes whether the boundary points t∗
Y and t∗
X are in the set of implementable poli-
cies. For example, consider cases (i) and (ii). In both conditions, F ′(ts) > 0 indicates
that the implementable set is a subset of τY . Hence, t∗
X will not be implementable, but
t∗
Y could be. Thus, we are interested in condition F(t∗
Y ) ≥ 0 rather than F(t∗
X) ≥ 0. In
(i) we infer from F(t∗
Y) ≥ 0 that F(t) possesses no further root in the interior of τ and
τI
Y is identical to the entire set τY . In (ii) F(t∗
Y ) < 0 and t∗
Y is not in the implementable
set. Hence, F(t) has a root at some ˆ tY ∈ τY . Thus, for all t ∈ τY , we can state that
if t ≤ ˆ tY then t ∈ τI
Y and if t > ˆ tY then t ∈ τ¬I
Y . The intuition for cases (iii) and (iv)
follows the same line of argument.
An illustration of case (ii) of Proposition 2 is given by Figure 1. As can be seen in the
graph, the slope of F(t) at ts is positive. Hence, the implementable set of policies (all t
for which F(t) ≥ 0) is a subset of the policies favoring Y . However, because F(t∗
Y ) < 0,
the implementable set is not comprised of all policies beneﬁting Y . The most favorable










Figure 1: Illustration of the partition of the policy space in case (ii) of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 outlines ﬁve diﬀerent decision environments that the agenda-setter may
face when considering his policy proposal. In particular, if τI
i  = ∅, then policy change
in favor of lobby i is possible, whereas the best lobby j  = i can hope for is that the
status quo remains. In the following, we speak of lobby i as the lobby seeking policy
change if τI
i  = ∅ and as the lobby opposing policy change or defending the status quo
if τI
i = ∅.
134.3 Subgame-perfect equilibrium of the political game
To complete the equilibrium analysis, we determine the policy proposal at the ﬁrst
stage of the political game. Facing a certain partition of the policy space induced by
the equilibrium of the lobbying subgame, the agenda-setter chooses the policy proposal
so as to maximize
VY(t) := UY (t) − UY (ts) = 1t∈τIvY (t) + 1t∈τI
X∪τ¬I
Y b(t). (4)
In the proposer’s objective function, 1t∈τI is the indicator function that returns a 1 if
t ∈ τI and a zero otherwise. The corresponding interpretation applies to the indicator
function in front of b(t). The ﬁrst term of the objective function represents the utility
gain derived directly from the new policy, which is only obtained by introducing an
implementable policy. The second summand represents the payments associated with
the policy proposal. The corresponding indicator function reﬂects the fact that bribes
are paid only for a vote in support of implementable policy proposals that favor the
ﬁrst mover X or a vote against non-implementable policy proposals in favor of Y .
Here we assume that the agenda-setter cares only about his own utility when crafting
the proposal. It might be more realistic that he also cares about the utility of his
fellow party members in the legislature because the party determines his committee
membership. Interpreting the Y -type legislators as the Y party, such an extension
could easily be incorporated into the agenda-setter’s objective and would not aﬀect the
qualitative results.
The maximization problem of the policy proposer can be solved using a two-step pro-
cedure. First, within each of the four relevant policy subsets, the most preferred policy
is identiﬁed, and in a second step, the policy is chosen that yields the highest utility
level of those four. The most preferred policy choices within the implementable and
non-implementable sets are deﬁned as
t
a




where a ∈ {I,¬I}. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that if within a set τa
i no policy
yields higher utility than the status quo, then the status quo will be chosen as the best
policy ta
i. The policy that yields the highest utility for the agenda-setter is







14In case of indiﬀerence between an implementable and a non-implementable policy, we
assume that the agenda-setter proposes the implementable one. With this tie-breaking
assumption, the proposer’s choice is unique.18 It is now possible to fully characterize
the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the political game.
Proposition 3 (Subgame-perfect equilibrium of the political game)
The political game possesses a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium where at the ﬁrst
stage the policy proposer proposes policy tg as given by (6) and then the equilibrium of
the lobbying subgame is played as speciﬁed in Proposition 1.
4.4 Characterization of the policy proposal




X is never strictly preferred to the status quo.
The reason is that if a policy t ∈ τ¬I
X is proposed, the status quo will prevail and –
according to Proposition 3 – the agenda-setter will not receive any payments. Hence,
VY(t¬I
X ) = 0. As a consequence of Lemma 2, we can neglect t¬I
X as a potential policy
proposal in the following.
It is now instructive to examine the most preferred policy proposals within the diﬀerent
implementable and non-implementable sets. First, consider the set τI
Y . Within this
set, the most preferred policy proposal maximizes vY (t). Hence we conclude that
tI
Y = maxτI
Y . Policies within the set τ¬I
Y cannot be implemented. Therefore, the best
choice for the proposer maximizes the amount of bribes, b(t). Equation (2) reveals that




With regard to the set of implementable policies favored by X, τI
X, the policy proposer
also seeks to maximize bribes, which increase with worsening policy proposals from
Y’s perspective. Intuitively, the reason is that interest group Y ’s willingness to pay
increases to avoid the pro-X policy. However, with respect to τI
X, the agenda-setter
faces a trade-oﬀ because he knows that such a policy proposal will be implemented.
Hence, the legislator of type Y who decides on the proposal suﬀers himself from a
18It will become clear in the next subsection why this is the case.
15policy change favoring X. For t ∈ τI
X, the proposer’s objective can be written as







This reveals that the utility gain of a Y -type agenda-setter from introducing an imple-
mentable pro-X policy is positive if and only if
2lY > S. (8)
Moreover, the proposer’s utility increases with |vY(t)|, implying that tI
X = minτI
X if
condition (8) is satisﬁed. If (8) does not hold, the status quo will be chosen.19 We
summarize our ﬁndings in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (Candidates for policy proposal)
(i) If τI









X  = ∅ and (8) is satisﬁed, then tI
X = minτI
X.
As a consequence of Corollary 1, the policy proposer does not have to decide between
proposing an implementable policy pro Y and an implementable policy pro X. If τ¬I
Y
is non-empty, the proposer’s most preferred non-implementable policy is t∗
Y. Hence,
when deciding on his proposal, the agenda-setter compares the utility gain associated
with the best implementable policy with the utility gain associated with the non-
implementable policy t∗
Y . If τ¬I
Y = ∅, t∗
Y is implementable. t∗
Y will be proposed because
any other non-implementable proposal yields no utility gain relative to the status quo
(see Lemma 2). For these reasons, we obtain the following:
Lemma 4 (Implementation bias)
The policy proposer introduces an implementable policy t ∈ {tI
Y ,tI
X} if and only if
IY (t) := VY(t) − VY (t
∗
Y ) ≥ 0.
We also refer to IY (t) as the policy proposer’s implementation bias. In this way, a
policy t that will be implemented necessarily satisﬁes F(t) ≥ 0 and IY (t) ≥ 0. The
ﬁrst condition ensures that the lobby opposing the proposal cannot create a majority
in the legislature against it. The second condition implies that the best implementable
policy proposal yields higher utility than the best non-implementable policy proposal.
19We assume that if 2lY = S, the agenda-setter chooses the status quo.
165 The Role of Interest-Group Size
In this section, we examine how interest-group size aﬀects the policy outcome. This
leads to the paper’s main result: an increase in the size of the second-mover lobby may
lead to adverse policy outcomes for this interest group. This result takes two forms.
First, if τI
X  = ∅, a larger size for Y may induce the policy proposer to introduce an
implementable policy change in favor of X rather than eﬀectively maintaining the status
quo by proposing a non-implementable pro-Y policy. That is, when the group Y that
opposes the policy change is small, the Y -type agenda-setter eﬀectively maintains the
status quo. However, if Y grows larger, he will propose a policy change to the beneﬁt of
lobby X. Second, if the implementable policy set contains pro-Y policies, an increase
in the size of lobby Y that is in favor of a pro-Y policy change may lead the proposer
to introduce a non-implementable pro-Y policy rather than an implementable one. Via
such policy changes or status-quo persistence, the second-mover lobby unambiguously
loses in utility even though this lobby has become stronger in terms of its budget.
Before we explain the two results in detail, we begin our discussion with the following
proposition that gives the eﬀects of lobby group size on the utility gains of the agenda-
setter with respect to the relevant best proposals within each set. This reveals how
the agenda-setter’s proposal choice at the second stage of his optimization problem is
inﬂuenced by the size of the interest groups.
Proposition 4 (Comparative statics – interest-group size)
(i) If ∅  = τI
Y   τY , then
dVY (tI
Y )





Y  = ∅, then
dVY (t∗
Y )
dlY > 0, and
dVY (t∗
Y )
dlX = 0 .
(iii) Suppose condition (8) is satisﬁed.
(a) If τI
X = τX and F(t∗
X) > 0, then
dVY (t∗
X)




(b) If ∅  = τI
X   τX, then
dVY (tI
X)




The proof can be found in the appendix. The situation where F(t∗
X) = 0 is a bit more
complex than that in Proposition 4 (iii) (a) and (b).20 As it is not essential to our main
20The only complication is that tI
X is not diﬀerentiable with respect to li if F(t∗
X) = 0. Loosely
speaking, the eﬀects of changes in li are a mixture between those in (iii)(a) and (b).
17results or the intuition behind them, we have not included this situation in Proposition
4. Instead we address this case in an extension of Proposition 4 that is provided in the
appendix.
The size of the lobbies directly determines their budgets available in the lobbying
subgame. While the budget of the ﬁrst-mover lobby only matters for the resulting
partition of the policy space, the budget of the second mover additionally inﬂuences
the amount of payments made to the legislators. The reason is that a greater size of
interest group Y implies that it becomes more expensive for lobby X to outcompete
Y .
Item (i) of Proposition 4 focuses on the situation where τI  = ∅ but not the entire set τY
is implementable. Then a growing lobby Y increases the set of implementable policies
that are pro-Y . Thus, it becomes more attractive for the agenda-setter to propose tI
Y .
However, as given in item (ii) of the proposition, a larger interest group Y makes it
also more attractive to choose a pro-Y policy that is not implementable. This is due
to the higher amount of payments associated with it. By contrast, an increase in the
budget of X does not aﬀect the payments made to legislators in this case. The reason
is that ﬁrst, the optimal policy choice in τ¬I
Y remains unaﬀected, and second, the lobby
only pays the amount necessary to secure a winning majority in the legislature. This
amount is not aﬀected by a change in the size of X.
The same line of argument applies in (iii) with respect to a potential proposal t∗
X when
τI
X = τX (and F(t∗
X) > 0). In contrast, if τI
X is a strict subset of τX, an increase in
lY has two eﬀects: an increase in payments for a given policy and an increase in tI
X
(as the set of implementable policies favoring X becomes smaller). The latter implies
lower payments, as we can infer from equation (2). Hence, whether the payments for
the policy proposer increase is ambiguous, and consequently, so is the utility gain from
proposing tI
X.
Proposition 4 contains another interesting result for the case ∅  = τI
X   τX. In contrast
to the situation where τI
X = τX, the utility gain of the policy proposer increases with
the size of the ﬁrst mover X. The reason is that the larger size of X increases the set
of implementable pro-X policies. Hence, worse policies from Y ’s perspective can be
implemented. These are associated with higher payments.
185.1 Policy changes induced by greater opposition
Consider the case where τI
X  = ∅. Then lobby X seeks policy change that Y opposes.
The trade-oﬀ for the agenda-setter is as follows. On the one hand, he can propose t∗
Y
in expectation of payments from lobby X while eﬀectively maintaining the status quo.
On the other hand, he can propose tI
X, which involves payments from interest group
X but also involves the implementation of a pro-X policy change. As discussed in
Section 4.4, the policy proposer will propose a policy change in favor of X if and only
if I(tI
X) ≥ 0. This condition can be written as
IY(t
I
















Y )] ≥ 0 (9)
Inspection of (9) establishes one of the central propositions of the paper.
Proposition 5 (Policy change)
Suppose τI










The intuition of Proposition 5 can be described as follows. According to (9), the
policy proposer only introduces a policy change in favor of X if the expected pay-
ments associated with it are suﬃciently larger than those associated with proposing
the non-implementable pro-Y policy. Once the proposal is put up for voting, lobby X
spends the smallest amount of money necessary to outcompete Y . Hence, payments
associated with the implementable pro-X policy can only be higher than those for a
non-implementable pro-Y policy if (i) interest group Y ’s willingness to lobby against tI
X
is suﬃciently larger than that to lobby for t∗
Y and (ii) the budget available as reﬂected
by the interest-group size lY is large enough.
Let us consider the implications and intuition of Proposition 5 in greater detail. We
start with the case where τI
X = τX. We can infer from (9) that as long as τI
X = τX
and −vY (t∗
X) > vY (t∗
Y ) are satisﬁed, the policy proposer’s implementation bias with
respect to tI
X is strictly increasing with lY . This is the main insight of the paper:
although an increase in the size of Y increases the costs for X to ensure a majority in
the legislature, it may still beneﬁt X as the policy proposer’s incentive to propose a
19policy tilted towards X increases. This implies that an increase in size for lobby Y may
actually trigger a policy change in favor of X introduced by a pro-Y policy proposer.
In particular, there will be no policy change if lY = 0 because in this case, condition
(ii) cannot be satisﬁed.21 This result oﬀers an explanation for the observation reported
in the introduction: that no opposition can be bad for the lobby seeking policy change.
In contrast, policy change occurs only if the interest group opposing policy change is
suﬃciently large.
Now consider the case where ∅  = τI
X   τX. Then, changes in the lobby sizes also aﬀect
the partition of the policy space. According to Proposition 4(iii) case (b), an increase in
lY has two opposing eﬀects on the incentives of the policy proposer. First, the payments
associated with each implementable pro-X policy increase. Second, however, the set
of implementable pro-X policies becomes smaller. Consequently tI
X increases, which
reduces the amount of payments achievable by the agenda-setter from proposing this
policy. In cases where the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, we obtain the result that in the case
τI
X   τX as well, a policy change towards X can be induced by an increase in the size
of lobby Y .
Now we ask whether an increase in the size of the interest group seeking policy change
will help this lobby to achieve change. From Proposition 4, we can infer that this
is possible if τI
X   τX but not if τI
X = τX. The intuition is that in our set-up, X
only spends the amount necessary to outcompete interest group Y once the proposal
is introduced. If τI
X = τX, an increase in lobby X’s budget will neither change the
partition of the policy space nor inﬂuence the payments for the legislators. Hence,
VY(t∗
X) and VY(t∗
Y ) and, consequently, IY(t∗
X) remain unchanged by an increase in lX.
In the case where ∅  = τI
X   τX, the set of implementable pro-X policies increases, and
if (8) is satisﬁed, this increases the utility from proposing tI
X. Since the utility gain
associated with the alternative non-implementable proposal t∗
Y , VY (t∗
Y ), is unaﬀected
by the larger size of X, we obtain that the implementation bias IY (tI
X) increases. The
important insight of this paragraph is that if τI
X  = ∅, an increase in the size of the
ﬁrst-mover lobby may not help to attain a policy change in its favor, but it also does
not have adverse eﬀects on the policy outcome for this lobby.
We summarize our observations in the following proposition:
21The reason is that (tI
X) is bound from below by v(t∗
X) for decreasing levels of lY and that as a
consequence, the right-hand side of (ii) will be strictly positive.
20Proposition 6 (Implementation bias when τI
X  = ∅)
Suppose condition (8) is satisﬁed and −vY (tI
X) > vY (t∗
Y).
(i) If τI
X = τX and F(t∗
X) > 0, then
dIY (t∗
X)




(ii) If ∅  = τI
X   τX, then
dIY (tI
X)




The proof can be found in the appendix. An extension of Proposition 6 for the case
where F(t∗
X) = 0 is also provided in the appendix. To state it explicitly, if the second-
mover lobby grows larger and the policy proposer’s most favorable proposal thereby
changes from the non-implementable policy t∗
Y to the implementable policy tI
X, the
utility of the members of Y declines and that of the members of X increases as a result.
The utility loss of lobby Y results from the worse policy’s being implemented when it
grows larger. In contrast, interest group X saves payments TX(t∗
Y ) and additionally
obtains a utility gain of lXvX(tI
X) + 2lYvY (tI
X) ≥ 0.
5.2 Status-quo persistence induced by stronger lobby in favor
of policy change
In this section, we show that even if the implementable policy set is a non-empty
subset of τY and hence no pro-X policy changes are possible, increases in the size of
the second-mover lobby Y can still involve detrimental eﬀects for it. In particular, the
increase in lY may lead to a persistence of the status quo even if a policy change in
favor of Y is implementable.
If ∅  = τI
Y   τY , the policy proposer faces the trade-oﬀ between proposing an imple-
mentable pro-Y policy and receiving no payments or proposing the non-implementable
policy t∗
Y that is associated with payments of lobby X, which opposes a pro-Y policy
change. Consequently, the implementation bias of the policy proposer is IY (tI
Y ) =
vY(tI
Y ) − b(t∗
Y ). Note that unlike in the situation wherein τI
X  = ∅, a positive imple-
mentation bias favors Y . How the incentive to propose an implementable pro-Y policy
depends on the lobby group sizes can be directly inferred from Proposition 4. An in-
crease in size of lobby Y increases both the set of implementable policies in favor of Y
and the payments associated with the non-implementable proposal. The former posi-
tively aﬀects the proposer’s implementation bias, whereas the latter exerts a negative
inﬂuence. If the second eﬀect dominates, we obtain the result that an increase in the
21size of interest group Y induces the persistence of the status quo rather than a policy
change for the beneﬁt of Y .
With regard to an increase in lX, a similar line of argument as in the situation where
τI
X   τX applies. An increase in lX reduces the implementable policy set pro Y but
leaves the payments associated with proposal t∗
Y unchanged. Hence, the proposer’s
implementation bias unambiguously declines with lX. We can conclude that in the
situation where τY  = ∅ an increase of its size will also not involve negative eﬀects on
the policy outcome for the ﬁrst mover. The next proposition summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 7 (Implementation bias when ∅  = τI
Y   τY)
If ∅  = τI
Y   τY , then
dIY (tI
Y )




The proof of Proposition 7 follows directly from Proposition 4. Interestingly, in case
the policy proposer’s most preferred proposal changes from tI
Y to the non-implemen-
table policy t∗
Y as the result of an increase in lY , both lobbies are worse oﬀ. That
Y loses in utility is obvious because with the smaller size lY , the members will enjoy
vY(tI




. Since the status quo by itself is more favorable than tI
Y
for X, the members of lobby X seem to proﬁt from the increase in lY . However,
they have to make payments in the amount of TX(t∗
Y ) = 2lYvY (t∗
Y ) to prevent the
implementation of t∗
Y when lY is large. If lY is small, each member of X suﬀers vX(tI
Y ).
Since 2lY vY (t∗
Y ) > 2lY vY (tI
Y ) ≥ −lX vX(tI
Y ), lobby X loses in utility if lY becomes
larger. Note that the last inequality holds because tI
Y is implementable – i.e., because
F(tI
Y) = lX vX(tI
Y ) + 2lYvY (tI
Y ) ≥ 0.22
5.3 Example
This section provides an example to illustrate the results and sharpen their intuition.
For simplicity, we use a discrete policy set τ = {1,2,3,4,5}. A numerical simulation
with a continuous set of policies is provided in Appendix A. We assume symmetric
utility functions for both types. In particular, we choose the quadratic form ui(t) =
−(t − t∗
i)2,i ∈ {X,Y }, which is often used in the literature. The bliss point of X is
t∗
X = 1, and that of Y is t∗
Y = 5. Let the status quo be ts = 3. Consequently, τX = {1,2}
and τY = {4,5}. Table 1 provides the two types’ utility gains relative to the status
quo and the values of F(t), b(t), and IY (t), depending on policy t. Note however
22Of course, the pure beneﬁt of the better policy ts would accrue to X-types that are not organized
in lobby X. They free-ride on the lobbying activities of interest group X.
22t 1 2 3 4 5
vY (t) −12 −5 0 3 4
vX(t) 4 3 0 −5 −12












S − 3) 2
lY
S − 5 - 3 − 8
lY
S 0
Table 1: Example with discrete policy space.
that in equilibrium the payments b(t) only accrue to the legislators if t ∈ τI
X ∪ τ¬I
Y .
Furthermore, IY (t) is only deﬁned for t ∈ {tI
X,tI
Y }. Hence the last line reads: given
t ∈ {tI
X,tI
Y } the policy proposer’s implementation bias is IY (t) as depicted in the last
row of the table. The function F(t) characterizes the partition of the policy space.
A policy is implementable if and only if F(t) ≥ 0, which ultimately depends on the







X = τX = {1,2}, τ¬I
Y = ∅, τI
Y = ∅, τ¬I







X = {1}, τI
X = {2}, τI
Y = ∅, τ¬I












X = ∅, τ¬I
X = {1,2}, τI
Y = {4}, τ¬I






X = ∅, τ¬I
X = {1,2}, τI
Y = {4,5}, τ¬I
Y = ∅, and tI
Y = 5.
For a policy to actually be implemented, not only F(t) needs to be non-negative but
also the policy proposer’s implementation bias IY(t). It can be observed in the table
that whether the proposer is willing to introduce an implementable policy (i.e. whether
IY(t) ≥ 0) depends on the relation of the second-mover lobby size and the size of the
legislature,
lY
S . For given utilities, this relation can be interpreted as a measure for the





lX. Consider a very small second-mover lobby. Then we ﬁnd
ourselves in the lower left rectangle of the graph in Figure 2. There the ﬁrst-mover
lobby is suﬃciently strong to form a majority for its most preferred policy given it












































when (1) S is larger than lX, and (2) S
is smaller than lX.
lobby is very weak, there will not be suﬃciently large bribes associated with this
proposal to compensate the Y -type policy proposer for the utility loss when tI
X = 1 is
implemented. Thus, the agenda-setter introduces the non-implementable pro-Y policy.
In the ﬁgure, we can now observe what will happen when lY grows larger. The expansion




S change by an increase in lY. This depends on
the relation between the size of the ﬁrst-mover lobby, lX, and that of the legislature,
S.23 Suppose that S < lX. Then, for example, we move along the lower dashed line
with the larger dashes when increasing lY . As depicted in Figure 2, when lY /S becomes
larger than 3/4 but lY /lX still remains below 1/6, the payments have grown suﬃciently
large that it becomes attractive for the policy proposer to change his proposal to the
lowest implementable pro-X policy. Moving further along the expansion path, lY /lX
grows larger than 1/6. Now t = 1 is not implementable anymore because Y is strong
enough to prevent a majority in favor of it. t = 4 is still implementable, but as long







S . Consequently, the
slope of the expansion path of lY is S
lX . Intuitively, the relation between lX and S indicates the
relative changes of the implementation bias and implementability by an increase of lY .
24as lY /S is smaller than 5/2, the bribes associated with it will be too low for the policy
proposer. A further change in the policy proposal occurs when lY /S grows larger than
5/2. When leaving the rectangle where tg = 2, no policy will be implementable until
the relative size of Y exceeds lY /lX = 3/2. Then t = 5 is both implementable and
introduced by the agenda-setter.
If S > lX, the expansion path of lY moves steeper as, e.g., indicated by the line with
the smaller dashes.24 According to the ﬁgure, the increase in Y ’s size does not induce
policy changes towards X. However if τI
Y  = ∅ – i.e., if lY /lX > 5/6 – an increase in lY
can lead to status-quo persistence. This occurs when lY /S has grown larger than 3/8
but lY /lX is still smaller than 3/2.
6 Discussion
In this section, we will ﬁrst examine how our results change if the agenda-setter’s type
coincides with that of the ﬁrst-mover lobby. Then we address the welfare implications
of both, policy changes induced by greater opposition and status-quo persistence. The
following subsection studies the robustness of the model with respect to greater het-
erogeneity of preferences among the legislators and the members of the interest groups.
Furthermore, we discuss extensions of the model that include lobbying at the proposal
stage and how the results are aﬀected when using diﬀerent lobbying subgames. Fi-
nally, we explain why a second-mover advantage in the Groseclose and Snyder (1996)
model with an exogenous proposal may turn into a second-mover disadvantage when
the policy proposal is endogenous.
24When interpreting S literally as the size of the legislature, the condition that S > lX may seem
to be relatively unrealistic. This changes however, if S is interpreted more broadly to also reﬂect
institutional details such as accountability in oﬃce. Suppose, e.g., that there is a certain probability ˆ µ
that a legislator will be caught when taking bribes and, if so, that he loses all of the bribes he has been
paid. Then, in the table, we need to add a factor (1 − ˆ µ) – i.e., the probability of not being caught
– to all terms with lY /S in the proposer’s implementation bias. For example, in the fourth column,
we would have 3 − 8(1 − ˆ µ)lY
S . Deﬁning µ = 1
1−ˆ µ, we could write 3 − 8lY
¯ S , where ¯ S = µS. Note that
if it is very likely for someone to be caught taking bribes (i.e., ˆ µ → 1), ¯ S approaches inﬁnity. Hence,
with this broader interpretation the situation wherein ¯ S > lX seems very realistic for well developed
democracies. A more detailed discussion on this issue can be found in Schneider (2009).
256.1 Preferences of policy proposer aligned with ﬁrst-mover lobby
Suppose that the policy proposer is of type X. We stay with the previous set-up of the
lobbying subgame where lobby Y is the second mover. Our main result is that if the
policy proposer’s preferences accord with those of the ﬁrst-mover lobby, an increase in
an interest group’s strength will not induce adverse eﬀects on the policy outcome for
this lobby.
As the the budgets of the lobbies and the sequence of their oﬀers are unaﬀected by the
preferences of the agenda-setter, the partition of the policy space remains unchanged.
The only diﬀerence from our previous set-up is that the policy proposer values imple-
mentable policies diﬀerently. As with (4), the objective of the X-type policy proposer is
to maximize VX(t) := UX(t)−UX(ts) = 1t∈τIvX(t)+1t∈τI
X∪τ¬I
Y b(t). The following lemma
summarizes the proposer’s most preferred policies within the relevant implementable
and non-implementable sets.25
Lemma 5 (Candidates for policy proposal of type-X agenda-setter)
If the proposer possesses X-type preferences, we obtain:
(i) If τI








Y  = ∅, then tI
Y = ts.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. As the payments associated with the non-
implementable pro-Y policies do not depend on the proposer’s preferences, we can
deﬁne the X-type proposer’s implementation bias in the same way as that of the Y -type
proposer. The X-type agenda-setter introduces the implementable policy t ∈ {tI
Y ,tI
X}
if and only if IX(t) := VX(t) − VX(t∗
Y ) ≥ 0. Investigating the implementation bias
yields the following results:
Proposition 8 (Implementation bias of type-X agenda-setter)
(i) If ∅  = τI
Y   τY , then IX(tI
Y) < 0.
(ii) If τI
X  = ∅ and −vY (tI
X) ≥ vY (t∗
Y ), then IX(tI
X) > 0.
(iii) If τI
X  = ∅ and −vY (tI
X) < vY (t∗










i, i ∈ {X,Y },a ∈ {I,¬I} is deﬁned similarly to (5) by ta
i := argmaxt∈τa
i ∪ts VX(t).
26A proof is provided in Appendix B.7. The proposition says that a policy proposer with
preferences tilted towards the ﬁrst-mover lobby will never introduce an implementable
policy favoring the second-mover interest group. The reason is that the X-type legisla-
tor derives negative utility from a pro-Y policy and there are no payments associated
with such a proposal. In contrast, if the set of implementable pro-X policies is non-
empty and −vY (tI
X) ≥ vY (t∗
Y ), an X-type proposer will always propose his most pre-
ferred implementable pro-X policy. The condition that −vY (tI
X) ≥ vY (t∗
Y ) ensures that
the payments associated with the non-implementable pro-Y policy are lower than or
equal to those associated with the implementable pro-X policy. If this condition is not
satisﬁed, the bribes for a non-implementable pro-Y proposal may be suﬃciently high
to push the proposer’s implementation bias into the negative. However, the X-type
proposer’s implementation bias cannot become negative as a consequence of an increase
in the size of lobby X (see item (iii) of Proposition 8). The proposition also states that
the implementation bias with respect to tI
X strictly decreases as a consequence of a
stronger second mover Y . Hence, when the proposer’s preferences are aligned with the
ﬁrst-mover lobby, greater opposition detrimentally aﬀects policy change.
6.2 Eﬃciency and welfare
A prevalent question in the literature is whether lobbying leads to eﬃcient outcomes,
respectively whether it improves welfare. In our model, lobbying does not lead to
Pareto-improvements as the lobbies’ payments accrue to the legislators and are not
used to compensate the members of the losing lobby. When using a utilitarian welfare
measure that sums the utilities of all interest-group members and all legislators, we
can easily construct examples where lobbying improves or decreases welfare relative to
the situation where lobbying does not take place.
However, one of the main points of this paper is that an increase in its size may result
in worse policy outcomes for this lobby. Concerning the welfare consequences of this
result, we make the following thought experiment. Consider a society consisting of X-
types and Y -types. Other than the legislators, all X-types are organized in lobby X,
but not all Y -types are members of interest group Y . Now the non-organized Y -types
join lobby Y . As our analysis showed, if τI
X  = ∅, this increase in lY may cause a policy
change from ts to tI
X. Further, if τI
Y  = ∅, the policy may change from tI
Y to ts as a
consequence. If they occur, do these policy changes involve welfare improvements?
27Proposition 9 (Welfare implications)
(i) Let τI
X  = ∅. The policy change from ts to tI
X caused by the increase in lY leads
to higher welfare if lY ≥ λYS.
(ii) The welfare implications of a policy change from tI
Y to ts caused by the increase
in lY are ambiguous.
To prove the proposition, note that ‘money’-transfers are neutral for welfare as they
enter the utility functions linearly. Hence, the welfare eﬀect depends on the utility
changes induced by the policy change. A welfare improvement results if
￿




X)| > (lY + λY S)|vY(tI
X)|. The left-hand side of this condition represents
the utility gain of the X-types (interest-group members and legislators) and the right-
hand side reﬂects the utility gain of the Y -types. If tI
X is implementable, we know
that lX |vX(tI
X)| ≥ 2lY |vY(tI
X)|.26 As a consequence, given lY ≥ λYS, we obtain
lX|vX(tI
X)| ≥ (lY + λY S)|vY(tI
X)|. This implies that the above condition for a welfare
improvement is satisﬁed.
With respect to status-quo persistence – i.e., a change from tI
Y to ts – we only know
that with the initial size of lobby Y , lo
Y , we had lX|vX(tI
Y )| ≤ 2lo
Y |vY(tI
Y )|.27 From this
condition we are not able to infer whether (lX+(1−λY )S)|vX(tI
Y )| > (lY +λYS)|vY(tI
Y )|
is satisﬁed or not. Indeed, one can easily ﬁnd examples where the former condition is
satisﬁed and the latter condition either also holds or does not hold.
6.3 Heterogeneity of preferences
So far, we have considered two diﬀerent types of individuals. Now we discuss how
robust our results are with respect to a greater heterogeneity of preferences regarding
policies. In particular, we additionally consider types j ∈ J characterized by utility
uj(t). J is a compact set that also includes the types X and Y . For all j, uj(t) is
strictly concave over τ. We denote the types’ utility gain relative to the status quo as
vj(t). The total utility of an individual of type j writes Uj(t) = uj(t) + d.
In the following, we want to illuminate two cases. The ﬁrst is where the legislators
possess heterogeneous preferences but the members of the interest groups are still either
an X-type or a Y -type. In the second case, we consider heterogeneous members of the
two interest groups.
26This condition is equivalent to F(tI
X) ≥ 0.
27This is because tI
Y was implementable and hence F(tI
Y ) ≥ 0.
286.3.1 Heterogeneity of legislators’ preferences
Consider the same model structure as in the main text, with the only diﬀerence being
that all of the legislators may have diﬀerent utility functions. Since in the model the
legislators are non-pivotal in the legislative vote, only the preferences of the policy
proposer matter. The key point that we make in this section is that the results derived
from the basic model carry over as long as the preferences of the agenda-setter are
suﬃciently tilted towards either of the types X or Y .
Because we still assume that X is the ﬁrst mover and Y the second mover, the partition
of the policy space remains unaﬀected by the legislators’ preferences.28 Again, we
denote the policy proposer’s best proposals within the diﬀerent implementable and
non-implementable sets by ta
i,i ∈ {X,Y },a ∈ {I,¬I}. Given that τI
X is non-empty,
the proposer introduces tI
X if and only if vj(tI
X) > b(t¬I
Y ) − b(tI
X), where vj(t) denotes
the policy proposer’s utility gain from policy t. Note that now, tI
X may also be in the
interior of τI
X. As in the main analysis, if ∅  = τI
Y   τY , the proposer introduces tI
Y if
and only if vj(tI
Y ) > b(t¬I
Y ).
These conditions reveal that – by the same mechanics as in the basic model – an increase
in the size of lobby Y can lead a policy proposer with bliss point substantially higher
than the status quo to introduce an implementable policy that is substantially lower
than the status quo. Similarly, such a policy proposer may choose a non-implementable
pro-Y policy rather than an implementable one as a consequence of a stronger second-
mover lobby. Of course, with a policy proposer with preferences suﬃciently tilted
towards those of the ﬁrst-mover lobby, we could obtain the results in Section 6.1.
6.3.2 Heterogeneity of preferences of interest-group members
Let us consider the basic model set-up with the only diﬀerence being that there are
more than two types of individuals who may join either of the two interest groups.
This is interesting because now, the size of the lobbies is endogenous. The moderate
types with bliss points around the center of the policy interval switch interest-group
28The reason is that the equilibrium in the lobbying subgame is not (crucially) aﬀected by the
preferences of the legislators. It may now be the case that the majority of legislators will not vote in
favor of the second-mover lobby Y without payments. However, in case that X has not oﬀered any
payments, Y only needs to pay a minimal amount ε to a suﬃcient number of legislators to ensure
a majority in its favor. These minimal payments are insigniﬁcant for the resulting partition of the
policy space.
29membership depending on the policy proposal. In the following, we argue that it may
be exactly this ‘swinging’ behavior of the politically moderate that can cause policy
outcomes to their disadvantage.
We begin the formal argument by determining the budgets of the interest groups. For
this purpose, we deﬁne θi(t) ≡ {j | sign(vj(t)) = sign(vi(t))}, where i ∈ {X,Y }. The
deﬁnition is interpreted as follows. Given a policy proposal t, the set θY (t) encompasses
all types that suﬀer a utility loss if an individual of type Y does. The equivalent
interpretation applies to θX(t). Furthermore, we assume that the distribution of types
is described by the measure P(j), with P(Y ),P(X) > 0. This means that given
policy proposal t, all individuals of types in θY (t) form an interest group ˆ Y of size
lˆ Y =
R
θY (t) dP(j) that lobbies for the proposal if vY (t) > 0 and against it otherwise.
The opponent of ˆ Y is ˆ X, which comprises a measure l ˆ X =
R
θX(t) dP(j) of members.




vj(t)dP(j) , i ∈ {X,Y }, j ∈ J.
We assume that lobby ˆ X makes the ﬁrst oﬀer and that lobby ˆ Y moves second.29 Then








where F(t) ≥ 0 indicates the implementable policies. It is not possible to further
characterize the function F(t) without additional assumptions regarding the diﬀerent
utility gains vj(t) and the distribution of types given by P(j). An interesting aspect,
however, is that the interest-group sizes directly depend on the policy proposal t. In this
way, lobby size is not exogenous anymore. In fact, the closer the policy proposal is to
the ideal point of the X-types, the larger the lobby ˆ Y that opposes this proposal. The
same is true with proposals close to the ideal point of the Y -types. This seems to suggest
that it is now harder to implement a certain policy. However, using similar reasoning as
in the basic model, it is precisely this ‘swing’ of the politically moderate interest-group
members that may lead to an implementable policy proposal opposite to these swing
lobbyists’ policy preferences. To be speciﬁc, consider a policy proposer of type Y . Given
the status quo policy ts, we still use τi to denote the policy sets favoring type i ∈ {X,Y }
relative to the status quo. Assume that there exists a non-empty implementable policy
29According to Section 3.3, a possible interpretation is that the majority of the legislators is of type
Y .
30set favoring type X (i.e., τI
X non-empty). The proposer’s utility associated with a
proposal t ∈ τI




θY (t) |vj(t)|dP(j). Consider
now a decrease in t within τI
X and denote by dθY(t) the increase in the set of types





















The ﬁrst integral subsumes the greater willingness to lobby against the proposal by
the ‘old’ members of lobby ˆ Y , and the second integral represents the willingness of the











Let tY denote the proposer’s best proposal outside of τI
X, which yields utility VY (tY ).
It is possible to ﬁnd examples where VY (tI
X) > VY (tY ) results from the eﬀect that the
closer the proposal gets to t∗
X, the smaller the supporting lobby ( ˆ X) and the larger the
opposing lobby (ˆ Y ) are. Thus, we obtain the results of Section 5.1 even with endogenous
interest-group sizes. In fact, it may be exactly the ‘swinging’ of the politically moderate
that makes tI
X an attractive proposal for the policy proposer. The reason is that the
agenda-setter expects the politically moderate to join the lobby against the proposal,
which results in higher bribes. As a consequence, the politically moderate individuals
would be better oﬀ if they did not organize. In Appendix A.1, we provide an example
wherein a higher level of organization of the politically moderate in interest groups
leads to less desirable policy outcomes for them.
6.4 Lobbying at the proposal stage
So far have we assumed that there is no lobbying at the proposal stage. However, the
data on, e.g., campaign contributions to members of the U.S. Congress as provided
by the Center for Responsive Politics suggests that committee members receive more
money than ‘ordinary’ legislators.30 The simplest way to extend our model to account
for this observation is to add another vote-buying subgame concerning the decision to
introduce a particular bill to the ﬂoor of the respective chamber. More precisely, at the
ﬁrst stage, the median legislator in the committee proposes a bill, and the committee
30See www.opensecrets.org.
31members vote as to whether it will be introduced for a vote in the legislature. If the
policy proposal is accepted by the committee, the lobbying subgame as depicted earlier
is played. If the proposal is rejected by the committee, the game ends and the status
quo remains in place. Assuming that the committee member proposing the policy is
of type Y, the additional lobbying subgame raises the hurdle factor for X to achieve a
policy change but makes it cheaper to prevent a proposal as t∗
Y from implementation.
The reason is that X has to buy two voting bodies for implementation but only one
for rejection. In the latter case, X will lobby the committee because it is smaller than
the legislature. For further detail on the structure of this lobbying subgame, we refer
to the paper by Diermeier and Myerson (1999). A result of this extension is that
the partition of the policy space changes. However, qualitatively the extended model
yields the same results as the basic version – with the diﬀerence, of course, that now
committee members receive higher payments than do ordinary legislators: for a policy
that is approved, they collect bribes twice, and for a non-implementable policy, they
are the only ones to receive payments.
That non-implementable bills are rejected at the proposal stage rather than by a ﬂoor
vote is a realistic aspect of this model extension. For example, as reported by Baum-
gartner et al. (2009), many of the issues that have failed without opposition have
not been considered for a legislative vote. The extended model can account for this
observation.31
Another question is whether our results change if the policy proposer can be inﬂuenced
directly by the lobbies with respect to the proposal he makes. Explicitly modeling
such an extension is beyond the scope of this paper. Our discussion is based on the
argument that independent of the speciﬁc formulation of the lobbying game played at
the proposal stage, as long as the agenda-setter is able to reject all oﬀers by the interest
groups, the utility derived in the political game without lobbying at the proposal stage
deﬁnes the outside option that need to be overbid by the lobbies.
31The critical reader may think that the cases without opposition that did not make it to the leg-
islative vote were of minor importance relative to other political issues. However, these political issues
include, for example, “Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness", “Medicare Payments
for Clinical Social Workers", or “The Government Pension Oﬀset and the Windfall Elimination Pro-
vision". In terms of monetary value involved or the urgency of the problems at play, they do not
appear to less critical than issues like the “Bear Protection Act", “Eliminating Budgetary Support for
USDA’s Predator Control", or the “Distribution of Low Power FM Radio Licenses". The latter three
issues faced substantial opposition and have been considered for a legislative vote. Descriptions of the
cases can be found on the website http://lobby.la.psu.edu.
32Suppose that τI
X  = ∅. As discussed earlier, if interest group Y is relatively small, the
Y -type policy proposer has a negative implementation bias – i.e., IY(tI
X) < 0. Suppose
that with this implementation bias on the part of the policy proposer, interest group Y
manages to avoid a pro-X policy proposal in the proposal lobbying subgame. According
to Proposition 5, an increase in the size of lobby Y may induce a change in the policy
maker’s outside option regarding the proposal lobbying subgame from IY (tI
X) < 0 to
IY(tI
X) > 0. Hence, although interest group Y has grown stronger, the situation it
faces in the proposal lobbying subgame has worsened because the policy maker’s ex
ante implementation bias has changed in favor of a pro-X policy proposal. Whether
the pro-X policy will be introduced depends on whether the higher budget of interest
group Y can make up for the less favorable position with respect to the policy-maker’s
implementation bias. It seems plausible that one can also ﬁnd situations in which there
is lobbying at the proposal stage where policy changes towards X are induced by an
increase in the size of lobby Y .
More directly, our model reﬂects there being considerably larger commitment problems
at the proposal stage than with respect to the ﬂoor vote. Reasons for this may be as
follows:
- Getting a bill to the ﬂoor can take several years.32 During this time major actors
on both sides, the lobby groups and the committee, may be substituted for others
or change their opinion.
- There is high uncertainty as to whether the proposal will make it to a legislative
vote at all. Also, it is oftentimes not obvious which role diﬀerent committee
members play in the process of crafting a bill. This can lead to diﬀerences in the
perceptions of the lobby and the legislator with regard to the inﬂuence exerted
by a certain legislator. In contrast, at least in the case of roll-call votes, the
contribution of each legislator to the passage of the bill can be readily observed.
- The interaction between the interest groups and the policy maker oftentimes does
not involve explicit discussion of a quid pro quo arrangement: rather inﬂuence is
bought by subtle exchange in which both sides recognize what is expected of them.
This is, e.g., suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2001). Explicit discussions
are avoided because the policy maker may be concerned that inﬂuence-peddling
involves high political costs if the deals become known to voters. Also, an explicit
32See e.g. Baumgartner et al. (2009).
33oﬀer of contributions in exchange for policies might irritate politicians because
they do not like to think of themselves as being for sale. Instead, the contributions
the lobby is willing to pay for diﬀerent proposals might be conveyed in a general
discussion about the strength of the interest group’s feelings about an issue and
its relative preferences regarding the alternative possible outcomes. Such implicit
coordination appears to be much easier to eﬀect for a vote for or against a certain
proposal than in an attempt to inﬂuence the exact formulation of the bill.
This paper emphasizes the importance of assumptions regarding the commitment and
lobbying possibilities at the proposal stage as they can lead to major diﬀerences in
theoretical predictions.
6.5 Diﬀerent lobbying subgames
The lobbying subgame of the Groseclose and Snyder (1996) type is the simplest model
that includes the central mechanics behind our results. That is, for policy proposals
that are associated with payments to legislators, the agenda-setter’s expected bribes
as paid by the winning lobby increase with the budget of the losing lobby.
Two recent papers, Dekel et al. (2008) and Dekel et al. (2009), examine a lobbying
game where the bidding process does not end at a pre-determined stage. Instead, the
alternating bidding process ends when two consecutive oﬀers go by without any change
in who would win if the game ended in those rounds. In these papers, the results with
respect to the total amount and the distribution of payments to legislators33 depend
on the speciﬁcs of the vote-buying model.
If the votes need to be bought via up-front payments – or if in the presence of exogenous
bidding costs, binding promises can be made to the legislators whose voting behavior
is observable – then for each given policy proposal, the lobby with the higher budget
wins the majority at negligible cost.34 The important point for our discussion is that
in this case, the legislators’ expected payments do not change with the strength of the
losing lobby.
33Dekel et al. (2008) investigates general elections, so it is the voters that receive bribes. It is
possible to reinterpret their model as a legislative lobbying model for a given proposal. In this paper,
we use this interpretation and, hence, speak of legislators rather than voters.
34In Dekel et al. (2009), it is assumed that legislators care about their voting behavior, not the
outcome of the vote. In this case, the winning lobby may have to make compensatory payments to
oﬀset a preference disadvantage.
34This is diﬀerent if payments to legislators cannot be made contingent on their votes but
promises of a lobby are instead fulﬁlled only if this lobby wins.35 Then the winning
lobby’s total payments to the legislators are slightly higher than the losing lobby’s
budget. However, only legislators with preferences close to the median may obtain
payments, and the distribution of bribes across the legislators is not uniquely deter-
mined.36 Hence, the total amount of payments by the winner increases with the losing
lobby’s budget. In principle, this makes it possible to obtain results similar to those
obtained using our basic model if the agenda-setter has a suﬃciently high probability
of being among the bribed.
Hence, the discussion suggests that this paper’s results are not speciﬁc to the Groseclose
and Snyder (1996)-type lobbying subgame but can also be obtained with other lobbying
subgames. As a consequence, our main results are not necessarily associated with
particular features of the Groseclose and Snyder (1996) model, such as super-majorities
or very high payments to the legislators. For example, as argued above, our results
may be obtained with a speciﬁcation of the lobbying subgame as in Dekel et al. (2009),
where a lobby’s promises are only fulﬁlled if this lobby wins. Then, the winning lobby
always buys a minimal winning majority of legislative votes. Moreover, total payments
to the legislators by the winning lobby are lower by a factor of two than in the basic
model presented in this paper.37
6.6 Second-mover disadvantage
In the literature, the asymmetry in the bidding process of the Groseclose and Snyder
(1996) model is interpreted as giving the second-mover a substantial advantage. As
the present paper highlights, this advantage may turn into a second-mover disadvan-
tage when the policy proposal is endogenous. The second-mover disadvantage can be
interpreted in two ways.
First, within our model, the second mover has a disadvantage if it would be better oﬀ
when moving ﬁrst. Such a situation occurs in the basic model if τI
X = τX and lY is such
35Additionally, there are no bidding costs.
36A similar result should be obtained when vote-contingent promises are possible and there are no
bidding costs but the lobbies experience some uncertainty about their opponent’s budget. Then the
bidding process would be similar to an English auction.
37Note that our model does not necessarily involve extremely high payments of the lobbies relative
to their beneﬁt. li may also reﬂect how well the interest group solves its public good problem and
thus may only reﬂect a small share of the Y -type population. This introduces a wedge between the
interest group’s budget and the corresponding social group’s welfare.
35that t∗
X will be implemented. Then, the second mover will be better oﬀ when moving
ﬁrst because – according to the analysis in Section 6.1 – the Y -type agenda-setter will
be aligned with the ﬁrst-mover lobby and propose ts rather t∗
X. The reason is that
when Y is the ﬁrst mover, the payments associated with t∗
X will fall to a minimum
and thus will not be able to compensate for the type-Y proposer’s utility loss from
this policy’s being implemented. It follows that lobby Y will be better oﬀ because in
neither situation will it have to make payments. However, when Y is the ﬁrst mover,
the status quo remains, whereas as a second mover, it will suﬀer from t∗
X.
Second, the second-mover lobby of our subgame may be better oﬀ with a more symmet-
ric speciﬁcation for the bidding process like the ones suggested by Dekel et al. (2008)
and Dekel et al. (2009). As described in the previous section, there are speciﬁcations of
the lobbying subgame where bribes paid in equilibrium are negligible and independent
of the losing lobby’s budget. In this case, an increase in the losing interest group’s
budget only changes the partition of the policy space in favor of this lobby; it does
not increase the attractiveness of any policy proposal due to higher expected bribes.
In this way, when the preferences of the policy proposer are tilted towards the weaker
lobby, the latter will never end up with a policy favoring its opponent relative to the
status quo. That is to say, this lobby will not lose relative to the status quo. As we
have shown, a utility loss relative to the status quo is possible for the second mover in
our model.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines the role of interest-group size on policy outcomes in a legislative
lobbying model that extends the Groseclose and Snyder (1996) model via endogenously
derived policy proposals.
The main insight of the paper is that the incentive of the agenda-setter to propose a
favorable policy for one lobby may increase with the relative strength of the opposing
lobby. As a consequence, it may be bad for a lobby seeking policy change if there is
no opposition. This is consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings on lobbying and policy
change and also provides another explanation as to why some interests in society are
not organized.
The model oﬀers several avenues for future research. Some interesting extensions of the
36model, such as allowing for greater heterogeneity of preferences or including diﬀerent
lobbying subgames, have been noted in the previous section. In particular, the paper
oﬀers a framework that can be extended to study how diﬀerent forms of lobbying at the
proposal stage interact with vote-buying in the legislature and how this aﬀects policy
outcomes. As the model in the present paper is static, it would also be interesting to
examine a dynamic version of the model where the policy chosen in the current period
is the status quo in the next. This extension allows one to study which policies are
stable in the long term and how this depends on the interest groups’ size.
Appendix
A Example with continuous policy space
In the text, we have given an example with a discrete set of policies. There the
implementable sets change in discrete steps rather than continuously in response to a
change in relative interest-group size. In this section, we provide a numerical simulation
that shows that the eﬀects and intuition explained in the discrete example carry over
to the continuous policy space.
As speciﬁed in Section 5.3, the utility functions are described by ui(t) = −(t − t∗
i)2,
where t∗
X = 1 and t∗
Y = 5. The policy interval ranges from 1 to 5 – i.e., τ = [1,5].
The status quo is ts = 3. To illustrate the eﬀect of an increase in second-mover lobby
size, lY , we consider two scenarios with respect to the size of the legislature relative to
that of the ﬁrst-mover lobby,
S
lX. These scenarios reﬂect the two expansion paths of lY
considered in the discrete policy space example.
We start with the scenario where S/lX is low. For the simulation, we choose S = 20
and lX = 200, i.e. S/lX = 1/10.38 In the ﬁgures, we depict the implementable sets, the
agenda-setter’s most preferred policy proposals within the implementable sets, and his
bias to implement them, depending on relative interest-group size,
lY
lX. The function
denoted by tI is the agenda-setter’s best choice within the implementable set.39 For a
given value of
lY
lX, the implementable set is the interval between tI and the horizontal
38For example there are 535 legislators in the 111th US-Congress. According to our assumption
interest group X would then comprise 5350 members. This does not appear to be unrealistic.
39Note that condition 8 is satisﬁed for all lY















Figure 3: Implementable sets and implementation bias of the policy proposer for dif-
ferent relative interest-group sizes lY /lX when S/lX is low.
line at t = 3 which depicts the status quo. The proposer’s bias to implement tI is
indicated by the blue curve IY (tI). Since only the sign of IY (tI) is of interest, the
value of IY (tI) has been divided by 20 for illustrative purposes in Figure 3. Suppose,
for example, that the relative size of Y is
lY
lX = 0.25. Then the implementable set is
τI = [1.7,3), and within τI, the proposer most prefers policy tI(0.25) = 1.7. We also
observe that IY (1.7) > 0. Thus, the policy proposer will introduce t = 1.7, which will
ﬁnally be accepted by the legislative vote. As discussed in the text, we can also observe
that if the second-mover lobby is suﬃciently small – in this example if lY/lX < 0.08
– all policies favored by X will be implementable but the associated payments for the
agenda-setter will be too low to make the proposal tI = 1 attractive. Furthermore,
Figure 3 illustrates that in the particular scenario with S < lX, the implementation
bias is negative if ∅  = τI
Y   τY . For example, if both lobbies are of equal size, the
implementable set will be τI = (3,4.5]. But instead of tI = 4.5, the proposer rather
introduces the non-implementable policy t = 5 because this proposal is associated with
high bribes.40
Now we consider the case where S is large relative to lX. In particular, we use S/lX =
2.5.41 In Figure 4, we see that the implementation bias is positive only if tI > ts (i.e,
if τI
Y  = ∅). In particular, I(tI) > 0 if the relative interest-group size is approximately
between 0.66 and 1.22. If Y grows larger, we will observe that the implementation
40This is similar to the exemplary expansion path for S < lX in the example with the discrete policy
space.
41More precisely, we use the values S = 100 and lX = 40. In a footnote concerning the discrete-
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Figure 4: Implementable sets and implementation bias of the policy proposer for dif-
ferent relative interest-group sizes lY /lX when S/lX is high.
bias becomes negative. Then, the payments associated with the non-implementable
policy t = 5 have grown suﬃciently faster than the utility associated with the best
implementable pro-Y policy. Hence, we observe status-quo persistence as a result of
an increase in the relative size of lobby Y . Only if lY /lX exceeds 1.5, the entire set
of pro-Y policies will be implementable and the agenda-setter will introduce the ideal
pro-Y policy.
A.1 Example with endogenous interest groups
In this section, we give an example where the organization of the politically moderate
into interest groups leads to a less desirable policy outcome for them. To make the point
as simple as possible, we use the example with the discrete set of policies and introduce
a third type of individuals Z with bliss point t∗
Z = 3. The distribution of types is given
by the measure P(j) = lj, j ∈ {X,Y,Z}. Table 2 gives the diﬀerent types’ utility
gains, the lobbies’ budgets, and the values for F(t), b(t), and IY (t), associated with
diﬀerent policies t.
Individuals of type Z are entirely happy with the status quo. Hence, in case of a pro-Y
policy proposal, they will join the X-types and organize in interest group ˆ X to lobby
against the proposal. With respect to a pro-X proposal, they will support interest
group ˆ Y . As we can see in the table, this makes it less likely that the pro-X proposal is
implementable – i.e., that F(t) ≥ 0. But if it is implementable, the payments associated
with the pro-X proposal increase and thus the policy proposer’s implementation bias
39t 1 2 3 4 5
vZ(t) −4 −1 0 −1 −4
vY (t) −12 −5 0 3 4
vX(t) 4 3 0 −5 −12
B ˆ X 4lX 3lX 0 −5lX − lZ −12lX − 4lZ
Bˆ Y −4(3lY + lZ) −5lY − lZ 0 3lY 4lY






















S − 3) 2
lY +lZ
S − 5 - 3 − 8
lY
S 0
Table 2: Example with endogenous interest groups.
increases.








S = 1. Then policy t = 2
is implementable as F(2) =
5
18lX > 0. The policy proposer’s implementation bias is
IY(2) = 1
2 > 0. Consequently, there will be a policy change to t = 2.42 However,
if the politically moderate Z-types do not organize – i.e., lZ = 0 – we will obtain
F(2) = 1
2lX > 0 and IY (2) = −1
2. Therefore, when the Z-types remain passive, their
most preferred policy, the status quo prevails. In contrast, if they organize, they will
end up with the less favorable policy t = 2. Note that the Z-types’ lobbying can also














B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
As stated in the text, the function F(t) is strictly concave and possesses a root at ts.
From the concavity, we infer that F(t) has at most two roots in τ. The conditions in
Proposition 2 – i.e., the value of F ′(ts) and whether F(t∗
Y ) ≥ 0 or F(t∗
X) ≥ 0 – indicate
whether the second root of F(t) is greater or smaller than ts, respectively whether it
is an element of τ. Consider the case where F ′(ts) > 0. F ′(ts) > 0 indicates that the
second root of F(t) is larger than ts and, consequently, the set of policies for which
42Note that t = 1 is not implementable in the given situation.
40F(t) ≥ 0 is a subset of τY . If F(t∗
Y) ≥ 0 is also satisﬁed, the second root of F(t) will
not be an element of τ. This implies that F(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ τY . If F(t∗
Y ) ≥ 0 does not
hold, the second root will be an element of τY . Denote this root by ˆ tY . Then, F(t) ≥ 0
for all ts < t ≤ ˆ tY and F(t) < 0 for all ˆ tY < t ≤ t∗
Y . The same reasoning applies for
the case F ′(ts) < 0 and the condition F(t∗
X) ≥ 0. In the special case that F(t) reaches
its maximum at ts, both implementable sets τI
Y and τI
X are empty. Consequently, the
status quo will remain in place. 2
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) An increase in the size of lobby Y aﬀects the agenda-setter’s utility from proposing













According to Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, tI
Y = maxτI
Y = ˆ tY .43 Hence, the
change in tI













































With respect to an increase in lX, the proposer’s utility from introducing an










































43Recall that ˆ tY is deﬁned by F(ˆ tY ) = 0 and ˆ tY  = ts.
41As vX(tI

















Y ) can be written as VY(t∗









Y ) > 0.







(iii) Suppose (8) holds. According to (7), the utility from proposing an implementable








. The diﬀerence between the cases (a)
and (b) is whether tI
X changes in response to a marginal increase in the size of
one of the interest groups.
(a) As F(t∗
X) > 0, tI
X = t∗
X is not aﬀected by a marginal change in the size of















(b) If ∅  = τI
X   τX, then tI
X declines if lY becomes larger and it increases in
response to an increase in lX.
First consider the case where lY increases. According to the proof of Propo-
sition 2 and Lemma 3, tI
X = minτI
X = ˆ tX. Concerning the agenda-setter’s
































































dlY > 0. As (8) is satisﬁed, 1 −
2lY





> 0. Taken altogether, the ﬁrst summand in (12) is negative. Since
2
SvY(tI
X) < 0, the sign of
dVY (tI
X)
dlY depends on the particular size of the sum-
mands and cannot be determined unambiguously.















































It follows directly that
dVY (tI
X)
dlX > 0. 2
B.3 Extension of Proposition 4 and Proof
Extension of Proposition 4
Suppose condition (8) is satisﬁed. If F(t∗




dlY T 0 when lY marginally increases.
(ii) VY (tI




dlX = 0 when lX marginally increases.
(iv) VY (tI
X) increases when lX marginally decreases.
Proof. Let us ﬁrst consider (i) and (ii) – i.e., changes in lY . We write the resulting























The only diﬀerence to the case where F(t∗
X)  = 0 is that tI
X is not diﬀerentiable with
respect to interest-group size at the point t∗
X. Consequently, depending on whether













, into (12). The right-
hand derivative is given by (13), whereas the left-hand derivative is zero. In this




dlY in Proposition 4 (iii) (a). The result when using the right-




Proposition 4 (iii) (b). This veriﬁes items (i) and (ii) of the extension of Proposition 4.













, is given by (15).
Thus, the eﬀect of a marginal increase of lX on VY (tI
X) is zero as one can infer from
inserting the right-hand derivative into (14). With respect to a marginal decrease of
lX, we insert the left-hand derivative into (14) and obtain the same result regarding
dVY (tI
X)
dlX as in Proposition 4 (iii) (b). This completes the proof. 2
B.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose condition (8) is satisﬁed and −vY (tI
X) > vY (t∗
Y ). If τI















X = τX and F(t∗
X) > 0, tI
X remains at t∗
X in response to changes in interest-group
size. Since vY (t∗
X) + vY (t∗









X) + vY (t
∗




dlX = 0 follows directly from Proposition 4.
(ii) If ∅  = τI
X   τX, the derivative of I(tI
































The ﬁrst term reﬂects that now tI




S < 0 implied by condition (8). The second term (after the minus sign) is also
negative since vY (tI
X) + vY (t∗




dlX > 0, can be directly deduced from Proposition 4. 2
B.5 Extension of Proposition 6 and Proof
Extension of Proposition 6
44Suppose condition (8) is satisﬁed and −vY (tI
X) > vY (t∗
Y). If F(t∗




dlY T 0 when lY marginally increases.
(ii) IY (tI




dlX = 0 when lX marginally increases.
(iv) IY (tI
X) increases when lX marginally decreases.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the extension of Proposition 4. We obtain
















(16). Items (iii) and (iv) follow directly from the items (iii) and (iv) of the extension
of Proposition 4. 2
B.6 Proof of Lemma 5
(i) For t ∈ τI
X, VX(t) = vX(t) −
2lY
S vY (t).








dt < 0. Thus, the
smallest t ∈ τI
X maximizes VX(t).
(ii) For t ∈ τ¬I
Y , VX(t) = b(t) =
2lY







dt > 0. Consequently, the largest t ∈ τ¬I
Y maximizes VX(t).
(iii) For t ∈ τ¬I




dt < 0, the smallest t ∈ τI
Y
maximizes VX(t). 2
B.7 Proof of Proposition 8
(i) For tI
Y , the X-type proposer’s implementation bias writes
IX(t
I







Y ) < 0.

















X) ≥ vY (t∗
Y), the second term is either negative or zero, and thus
IX(tI
Y ) > 0.
(iii) It follows directly from inspection of (17) that IX(tI
Y ) might be positive, zero, or
negative, if −vY (tI
X) < vY (t∗
Y ). The derivative of the implementation bias with






















We know from the proof of Proposition 4 and its extension that
dtI
X




dlX = 0 if tI
X = t∗






























X) + vY (t
∗
Y )].




Consequently, the ﬁrst term is either negative or zero. If −vY (tI
X) < vY (t∗
Y ), the
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